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Abstract 
An investigation was conducted into web vulnerabilities in commonly used web application 
templates and frameworks (WAFs) systems such as Joomla, WordPress, Moodle and C #.Net framework. 
A web vulnerability scoring scheme was developed and used to record metrics of the vulnerabilities 
associated with the web application templates and frameworks. A custom web application was also 
developed purported to demonstrate how the vulnerabilities could be shielded in web application 
frameworks (WAFs). The investigations and implementations were guided by Open Web Application 
Security Project. The study found some of the most common vulnerabilities in the frameworks and 
templates at different levels. The choice of Content Management Systems (CMS) templates and WAFs 
for web application systems development can then be guided by this study. 
1 Introduction 
Web-based systems consistently remains the top most frequent mode of ingress into systems and data 
breaches in the world[1, 2] despite their indispensable services[3, 4]. According to Semantic report, there 
was a global increase of 56 percent on web related attacks on endpoints in 2018[1]. In spite of the high 
increment in attack, Bitnami reported that over one million web applications are being deployed on its 
web store in every month[5]. This indicates the necessity of web-based systems in this era. Bitnami is 
just one of the web stores with various web application frameworks, content management systems (CMS) 
and templates for constructing web-based systems[5]. Bitnami makes it very easy for users to deploy 
web applications. It has over 130 most popular web application templates which can be used for web 
application development for vital and sensitive business areas such as e-commence solutions, corporate 
websites, university systems management and many more [6]. Web template Or Content Management 
System (CMS) is known as an already designed web application system  which allows users to “plug-
in” or substitute contents such as text, images and video into the web system[7-9]. A web application 
framework (WAF) is a library that makes it possible to develop a web application using pre-written 
code[7, 8]. WAFs provide mechanisms to enable typical work 
flows in web application development. The essence of the frameworks, templates and CMS (known 
in this study as WAFs) are to prevent repetitive and complex tasks, providing professional non-functional 
requirements such as navigations and look and feel.  WAFs were also developed to address some 
challenges associated with web application developments such as need for integration of unstructured 
information with structured information, management of web pages and to ease web development 
challenges and difficulties often faced by non-technical,  web application developers[7-10]. Additionally, 
other web application frameworks such as model, view and controller in C#.Net were developed to ease 
the web application development burden for technical IT experts. These  WAFs helps the developer to 
concentrate on their core scenarios[4]. Web application frameworks have gained wider adoptions by 
users who have no professional IT training, SMEs and those who lack some kind of skills such as 
interface designs or coding which are often offered by these template systems[11] [4]. The materials 
which were investigated in this study include Content Management, Templates and frameworks. 
Therefore, Web Templates, CMS or WAF were used interchangeably in this study.  
 
Considering the higher rate that web applications are being published, versus the higher rate of ingress 
into systems through web application systems, it triggers an alternate thinking that web-based template 
systems are associated with the most common vulnerabilities and hence driving the rise in attack. It is 
also considered that web templates are largely used particularly by SMEs who lack financial capabilities 
and IT experts to develop web systems from scratch[7-10]. Medium sized enterprises are companies with 
less than 250 employees, less than 50 million annual turnover and a balance sheet total of less than 43 
million euros[12]. Small enterprises include companies with less than 50 employees, a turnover of less 
than 10 million and a balance sheet total of less than 10 million[12]. SMEs accounts for 99% of all 
enterprises in the European Union while providing millions of jobs[12].  SMEs rely on internet resources, 
such as web related systems, to gain the muscles and agility of larger organizations such as omnipresence, 
just in time delivery and faster rate of data processing capabilities. However due to the use of such 
resources in their  operations, SMEs are more exposed to cyber threats in recent times and account for 
58% [13]in  cyber-attack in the past 12 months with an average cost of an attack estimated to be around 
$3 million, which includes cost of downtime during a breach,  loss of profits, loss of clients and partners, 
loss of trustiness and cost incurred through mitigations. The main reasons why SMEs heavily rely on 
web application frameworks and templates are fewer personnel, low financial resources, less IT expertise 
and reliance on external expertise[14, 15]. Based on these reasons, the design and implementation of 
these WAFs were possibly   aimed at large companies and did not consider the challenges and security 
needs of SMEs. Therefore, the contribution of this study was to investigate into the most commonly used 
WAFs for the most common web vulnerabilities and to develop a framework for proactive defenses. 
SMEs for instance, would therefore know the vulnerabilities associated with the various templates and 
their mitigation strategies and this can guide them in their decision of WAFs usage.  
2  State-of-the-art 
Web application templates, frameworks or content management systems are pre-designed, coded 
and implemented web-based systems with the aim to ease some kind of difficulties often faced by their 
targeted users. CSM such as Joomela!,  Moodle and WordPress were developed to meet usability and 
non-technical users who desire to create professional web sites and web applications. Microsoft .Net 
framework has model, view and controller components to meet separation of concern requirements and 
to ease the repetitive burden from developers. Due to the needs being addressed by these WAFs, the 
usage rate is quite high[5]. But the question is that how does these WAFs meet security requirement of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA)? Are they not contributing to the increasing rate of 
ingress through the web systems if security is traded for usability and ease of systems development for 
low skilled IT persons and novices? 
In addressing these questions, De Meo, et al, studied into SQL Injection (SQLi) security flaws in web 
application frameworks and developed SQLfast which is used as a formal approach for exploiting SQLi 
attacks. ASLan++ was used at the input as  the modeling language with the AVANTSSAR Platform for 
security protocol analysis[16]. ASLan++ is for formal specification of  dynamically composed security-
sensitive web services and service-oriented architectures, their related security policies, and security 
properties, at the communication and application level[17]. AVANTSSAR is a framework for 
specification and Validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures[18]. In SQLiFast, the 
ASLan++ translator, generates a transition system in the low-level language which is used to call a model 
checker and generates an Abstract Attack Trace (AAT) in attack scenarios. SQLfast automatically detects 
which type of SQLi has been exploited and, in an interactive way and generates the curl or sqlmap 
commands to support the attack reported. A proof-of-concept was conducted on WebGoat, Damn 
Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA), Joomla! 3.4.4, and Yet Another Vulnerable Web Application 
(YAVWA). De Meo, F. et al. study revealed  possible SQLi vulnerability associated with an older version 
of Joomla! and known vulnerable websites but the vulnerability studied  did not cover a lot of the top ten 
OWASPs outlined vulnerabilities[19] and the WAFs covered in this study were not among the most 
commonly used WAFs[5]. 
 
In defending against web vulnerabilities related intrusions, Saxena et al [20] proposed 
“SCRIPTGARD”, which is a system that provides guarantees against code injection attacks and can be 
implemented on legacy applications. Saxena et al., analyzed sanitization defenses in a web application 
with over 400,00 lines of code. The system was widely used and was potentially processing untrusted 
data from users. Sanitization is the mechanism of using filters on user inputs to prevent the compromise 
of CIA from untrusted data[20]. The study revealed inconsistent sanitization and inconsistent multiple 
sanitization flaws. Application developers were inadvertently mismatching their choice of sanitizers with 
the browser’s parsing context. The vulnerabilities were not lack of validation issues but rather due to 
indirect nesting of HTML contexts and sharing of dataflow paths in the application. Specifically, 
inconsistent sanitization on 1,207 paths were found (representing 4.7% of the total paths) and observed 
an additional 285 instances of inconsistent multiple sanitization. Based on the findings, Saxena et al., 
suggested the use of automatic sanitizer placement such that, in an application, automatic selection of 
the suitable sanity checks would be applied on a dataflow path from a possibly untrusted data source to 
an HTML output sink. Saxena et al., provided knowledge on how to place sanitizers for effective 
countermeasures of injection flaws however, knowledge on vulnerabilities associated with web 
application frameworks was not provided so users with low security abilities such as SMEs and 
individuals have no knowledge on the kind of vulnerabilities that may exist in these templates. 
According to Weinberger et al., Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks has been a notorious threat to 
existing and emerging web applications. Even Larger web service organizations such as Google 
Analytics, Facebook and Twitter have not been spared with XSS attacks. In their contribution, 
Weinberger et al., conducted a systematic analysis of XSS sanitization in WAFs[4]. The study thoroughly 
studied into the security of the XSS sanitization concepts frameworks and  develop a model of the web 
browser to determine the challenges of XSS sanitization. The result was used to systematically evaluate 
the XSS abstractions in some web application framework including CodeIgniter, ASP.NET Request 
Validation, XSS terminate Rails plugin, Django, GWT SafeHtml. Ctemplate and CLEAESILVER[4]. 
The study disclosed that the frameworks were not addressing critical parts of the XSS problem.  There 
was huge difference between the abstractions provided by frameworks and the requirements of 
applications. 
Some of the WAF disclosed the security mechanisms in their systems. WordPress claim that the 
default html tags permitted on its framework are healthy choice to let people use html in their comments 
and posts, without compromising the security or safety of the user’s data or server [21]. Joomla! 
Developed  JInput class for input filtering at its default setting[22]. Moodle has exhibited its security 
issues of which XSS partially protected but default password was a serious threat[23]. Obviously, these 
frameworks claim to have some kind of security protection, but the objective investigation would reveal 
the actual security the states of WAFs. 
3 Materials and Methods 
A literature survey was conducted in IEEE-Xplore, Google Scholar, Science Direct/Elsevier and 
Springer, to determine related studies of security measures in considering the security challenges 
associated with the usage of WAFs. In Addition, some investigation methods were used to assess the 
vulnerabilities on commonly used Web Application Frameworks (WAFs) and templates. Traditional 
system development life circle (SDLC) was used to develop web application purported for the security 
implementation framework of WAFs for SMEs. The investigation techniques were again used to evaluate 
the security measures built into the developed web application.  Generally, Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) standard of testing and securing against the vulnerabilities and other 
standards were adopted [24].  
The Web Application Frameworks (WAFs) outlined in Table 1, were used as victims of attack in the 
study and were tested for different vulnerabilities. A web application (WebPOS) was also developed and 
used as a tool to attack the WAFs and was a victim of attack to test for the security resilience after the 
implementation of the security measures against the assessed vulnerabilities.  Details of these materials 
are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Materials and their attributes used 
Resource/Tool Version Hosting Usage Type 
    WordPress 4.5.3 hosted with xampp Victim 
Joomla! 3.5.1 Hosted with Xampp Victim 
Moodle 3.1.1+ Hosted with Xampp Victim 
MVC C# .Net 4.0.30319 Hosted with Internet 
Information Services (IIS) 
Victim 
WebPOS Designed with php 
version 5.6 
Hosted on Azure web 
services 
Attacker/Victim 
Tryit editor 3.0 W3Schools Attacker 
MySQL Ver 15.1 Distrib 10.1.28-
MariaDB, for Win32 
(AMD64) 
Locally hosted with 
Xampp and remotely with 
Azure web service 
Victim/Attacker 
html 5.0 N/A Attacker 
 
With reference to Table 1, the Resource or Tool column indicates the names of the resource or tool 
used in the study. The version column indicates the version of the material used while the hosting column 
indicates the server and where the service or material was hosted. The type of usage column indicates 
how the material was used. A victim indicates that the material or tool was used as a target while an 
attacker means that the WAFs was used as an attacker site to attack the victims. 
Default settings of some web application frameworks(WAFs) were tested for vulnerabilities. The 
vulnerabilities tested were Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Reverse 
Shell or File upload (RSA), SQL injection (SQLi), Session Hijacking (SHJ), Exposed Accessed 
Credential (EAC) and Brute Force Attack (BFA). Guideline for selecting these vulnerabilities were taken 
from OWASP top ten vulnerabilities[25].  A common approach of testing for each of these vulnerabilities 
was adopted for the WAFs such as WordPress, Joomla, Moodle and .Net framework (C#) as shown in 
Table 1. A scoring scheme was developed as shown in Table 2 and it consists of  the WAF column  which 
corresponds to the web template system, to be tested, such as WordPress. The Vulnerability ID (VUL. 
ID) uniquely identify the vulnerability to be tested. The vulnerability column corresponds to the 
vulnerabilities tested. 
 
Table 2: Scoring scheme of vulnerabilities 
WAF VUL. ID VULNERABILITY SECURITY 
LEVEL  
WordPress XSS cross-site scripting (XSS) 
 
BFA brute force attack  
 
SQLi SQL Injection  
 
RSA File upload or Reverse Shell Attack 
 
SHJ Session hijacking 
 
XSRF Cross-site Request forgery 
 
EAC Exposed Access Credential 
 
 
Further, the security level column indicates the test score of the security level of the web application 
framework in respect to the corresponding vulnerability. The vulnerability levels were rated as 
follows[26]; 
i. A security level of 1 means that the system was completely anonymous to vulnerability test and 
test really proved that vulnerability was not present in the template. This gives no clue to the 
hacker.  
ii. A security level of 2 means that there was an incomplete protection against the vulnerability. 
The test indicated that the vulnerability was protected in the template, but the system was not 
completely anonymous. Example, in a vulnerability test, the protection mechanism resulted  in 
giving feedback to user or attacker on the level of protection or revealing system information 
which turn to be educative to the hacker.  
iii. A security level of 3 means that the vulnerability was present.  
The vulnerabilities were tested manually by using a blend of Black-box and Gray-box methods[27, 
28].  Black-box analysis estimates an application’s security level from the point of view of an external 
attacker, with no insider knowledge of the application. Gray-box testing was done such that it involves 
an attacker being considered a user with some system privileges, such as an employee[25, 27-29].  Some 
vulnerability scoring systems which are commonly used include Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS) [30], Vulnerability Rating and Scoring System (VRSS)[31] and Microsoft security update 
severity rating [32] but their target users are  highly skillful and IT security expert. They include vendors 
who might be bias in their scoring and IT security experts may be expensive for hiring affordability of 
SMEs. In view of this, a simpler but effective tool (SS) was developed for scoring the vulnerabilities in 
this study.  
 
3.1 Methods used in testing for vulnerabilities 
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a kind of attack which forces an end user to execute unwanted 
actions on a web application in which the user successfully  authenticated [33]. The basic steps to 
determine if a target website was vulnerable is to check if that target web page was able to be loaded into 
an iframe[34]. This was done by determining if that target or victim web page could be loaded into an 
iframe. This was done by creating a web page with an iframe on WebPOS[34] as follows: 
 <html><head> <title>Clickjack test page</title></head><body><p>Website is vulnerable to 
clickjacking!</p><iframe src="http://localhost:85/frameworks/wordpress/wp-
admin/post.php?post=1&action=edit" width="500" height="500"></iframe></body></html> 
 
The expected result is that if the message in the paragraph tag within the body tag (Website is 
vulnerable to clickjacking!)  at the top of the page was seen and the target web page was successfully 
loaded into the frame, then that target site was vulnerable and has no type of protection against 
Clickjacking attacks[34]. XSS attacks occur when a hacker uses a web application to send bad code, 
mostly in the form of a browser side script, to a target end user. XSS can occur anywhere a web 
application receives input from a user without the output or the input being validated or encoded[35]. In 
this studies, malicious codes were injected into the database of the website using one of the forms of the 
website. The victim requests a page from that website which included the malicious string from the 
database. The success of attack of the inject of the malicious inject was then accessed [36]. File upload 
or Reverse shell attack testing procedure was basically determining if the file size and or type had some 
limitations during file upload[37]. SQL injection occurs when a hacker sends untrusted codes into an 
interpreter. The initial step to determine if a website was vulnerable to SQL injection (SQLi)  was to 
inject a single quote at the end of the website url of a page that showed vulnerable[38]. If the page remains 
anonymous or gives error messages without revealing system information, then the site was not 
vulnerable to SQL injection. SQL injection can also be done through other user inputs[2, 38].  
Conversely, if the page returns error revealing the system information, it is an indication that the website 
was vulnerable to SQL Injection[2, 38]. 
Exposed Access Credential occurs when a file containing user credential is able to be executed by 
the server leading to the exposure of the user credential[25, 39]. A basic test of this weakness was done 
by running the file containing the user credentials. If the credentials were displayed in plain text, it 
indicated that the web applicant had no protection against EAC vulnerability[25, 39]. Brute Force Attack 
consists of an attacker configuring predetermined values, making requests to a server using those values, 
and then analyzing the response[25]. It involves number of tries, with the predicted values. To test for 
the brute force attack on a login screen, the attacker attempts logging in with several password with a 
particular user name. If the system disables the account of that user after some number of attempts for 
instance, it means there was  brute force protection mechanism in place [40, 41]. Session Hijacking 
occurs when an attacker steals victims authenticated session identification and use that to hijack the 
victim’s authenticated system without the knowledge of the victim[42]. This was tested by finding out 
basically if there was basic session expiration implemented on the website. This was done by logging on 
to the various pages and being inactive on them for an average of 60 minutes. If resources of those pages 
could not be accessed and the sessions expire, it means some session protection mechanism was in place 
[42]. 
 
3.2 Security implementation methods on webPOS 
To effectively secure web applications against the studied vulnerabilities, a web application(webPOS) 
was developed. The purpose was to use the system to evaluate a security implementation framework on 
how the web application could be shielded from the studied attacks. The vulnerabilities which were 
prevented in the implementation are SQLi, XSS, CSRF, BFA, SHJ, RSA and EAC. OWASP and other 
standards were adopted[25, 43]. With SQLi, one of the ways used to protect WebPOS against SQLi is 
by using prepared statement[16]. Further to this, the function, mysqli_real_escape_string(), was used to 
filter all user inputs. This function escaped special characters in user inputs, by using the current charset 
of the connection [27, 44]. CSRF was protected by using generated session token. On the user input form 
a random token was generated into a token session by using the function 
openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(16)[45]. The generated session token was stored in a hidden input field. 
During processing, the token submitted by “POST” method was  compared with the token stored in the 
session[45]. If there was a variance, an error would be generated and an alert of Invalid AntiCSRF 
displayed. For XSS all the user inputs were passed through some filters such as stripslashes() and 
htmlspecialchars(). These functions convert all special characters into html equivalents of all scripts 
injected as client data[2]. In the implementation against BFA, the system keeps a log of failed login 
attempt each time a wrong password was entered against a correct user name[40, 41]. If the password 
entered was incorrect against that username for 3 times, that user account was disabled. A feedback 
message was sent to the user in notification about the account being disabled. The user was directed to 
contact the system administrator. The key point was for the account to be disabled if a wrong password 
was entered against a correct username for a continues number of times. For SHJ, IP binding and session 
timeout methods were used to secure the code against session high jacking[42]. At login and during 
session creation, the remote IP address of the client and time logged were stored in respective sessions. 
On accessing a page, the stored IP address was compared with the current client accessing the page. If 
the IPs differed, that client was logged out. Also, if there was an inactivity for more than 30 minutes, in 
attempt to access the secured page, the session expires and the user was logged out[42]. A secure code 
was developed by limiting the file type and size[25] against RSA while EAC security measure was 
implemented by using the file type .php  for storing the user credentials[39]. 
In evaluating usability, SUS scale, which is a Likert scale which results in a single number 
representing the total measure of the entire usability of a system under study, was used [46].  This was 
adopted in this study to measure the usability of the custom designed web application (WEBPOS). The 
score for individual items are not meaningful on their own in SUS study[46]. The SUS score calculation 
was done by, first summing the score contributions from each question. Each question’s score 
contribution ranges from 0 to 4. For questions 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 the score contribution calculation is the 
scale position minus 1. For question 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10, the contribution is 5 minus the scale position. The 
sum of the scores were then multiplied by 2.5 to obtain the overall value of SU. The average and 
standard deviation were then computed to determine the variation[46]. 
4 Results 
The results of the various frameworks (WordPress, Joomla, Moodle and MVC.Net Framework) 
which were tested is presented. The security test and implementation results of the custom designed web 
point of Sales System (WEBPOS) and SUS tests were also presented in this section. 
4.1 Security Tests and Results on WAFs 
 
In testing for XSS, Iinitially, the script,” <script>Alert (document.cookie);</script>“ was injected 
through a comment input box of a WordPress template and the script was able to be executed as shown 
in Figure 2. The attack was further performed to steal the session cookie onto the attacker web server. 
This was done by injecting the “<script>'http://webposproject.azurewebsites. net/ 
addEmployeeForm.php ?id='+ document.cookie</script>”,  in the comment box of. This was able to 
steal the user session information to the hacker’s web server ”http://webpos-
project.azurewebsites.net/addEmployeeForm.php?id=wp-settings 1=mfold%3Df%2 6editor %3Dhtml; 
wp-settings-time-1=1467633109; wordpress_test_cookie=WP+Cookie+check”  which is indicated  in  
Figure 2. This led to a score of a vulnerability level of 3 as indicated in Table 3. Each of the outlined 
vulnerabilities (Vul. ID) in Table 2 was assessed subsequently in each of the WAFs in Table 2. The 
vulnerability scores were then recorded in Table 3 in accordance with the scoring which was specified 
in section3. 
  
Figure 2: Injection of script on 
comment box   on WordPress Site. 
 
Figure 3: Resilience against CSRF 
 
 Table 3: Tabulated Vulnerability Scores of WAFs 
 
 .Net Joomla! Moodle WebPOS WordPress All 
BFA 3 3 3 1 3 13 
EAC 2 1 1 1 1 6 
RSA 3 1 1 1 1 7 
SHJ 3 1 1 1 3 9 
SQLi 2 1 1 1 1 6 
XSRF 2 3 2 1 2 10 
XSS 2 1 1 1 3 8 
All 17 11 10 7 14 59 
 
With reference to Table 3, WebPOS registered the lowest vulnerability cumulative sum of 7 while .Net 
framework registered the highest cumulative value of 17. 
 
The WebPOS development included pages for system settings, creating and adding products, 
updating a sales transaction page, user login and a report center. The system also has interfaces for user 
accounts creation and login. In the WebPOS application, the major focus was to implement security 
framework against the vulnerabilities investigated in this study. The security implementation 
framework against the various vulnerabilities are outlined below: 
• The code below provided protection against XSS.  
$partname=stripslashes($partname); 
$partname=mysqli_real_escape_string($db,$partname);$partname= tmlspecialchars($partname); 
$partname = trim($partname); 
$partnumber = stripslashes( $partnumber );       
• Security implementation against brute force attack: 
In this code, the user is disabled if the wrong password was submitted to the database against a 
correct user name for more than three times. 
if($attempt>3){ $stmt=$sqlcon->prepare("UPDATE WebPOS_user SET userStatus=0 
WHERE username=?  "); 
 $stmt->bind_param('s',$username); 
 $stmt->execute(); $error= "Your user account is disabled! Contact Admin".;} 
•  Ssecurity Implementation Against SQLi 
Real escape string function and prepared statement were used to protect against SQLi. The  
real_escape_string function was used to escape malicious input characters while the prepared 
statement was used to bind parameters or place holders for receiving user input data. Once there is 
bonding, the input data is placed into an already constructed SQL statement and sent to the database 
to be processed[47] as shown in the code below; 
$discount=mysqli_real_escape_string($db,$discount); 
$discount = htmlspecialchars($discount); 
$discount = trim($discount); 
$msg=""; 
//prepare statement  
if ($stmt = $sqlcon->prepare("SELECT discountID FROM discount where 
percentDiscountRate LIKE ?")) { 
$stmt->bind_param('i', $discount); 
• Security implementation against File upload or Reverse Shell Attack 
As shown in the code below, the file size and type were restrict to prevent RSA. 
        if( ( strtolower( $uploaded_ext ) == "jpg" || strtolower( $uploaded_ext ) == "jpeg" || 
strtolower( $uploaded_ext ) == "png" ) &&( $uploaded_size < 100000 ) && getimagesize( 
$uploaded_tmp ) ) { 
else $msg = "Your image was not uploaded. You can only upload JPEG ,PNG images and 
Max. file size of 100KB"} 
• Security implementation against Session hijacking 
With reference to the code below, IP binding and session time out were implemented to protect 
this weakness as shown below;$ip=$_SESSION["ip"]; $timeout=$_SESSION ["timeout"]; if 
(!($ip==$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'])){ header("location: logout.php"); // Redirecting To 
Other Page} if($_SESSION ["timeout"]+1800 < time()){ //session timed out header("location: 
logout.php"); // Redirecting To Other Page }else{ //reset session time 
_SESSION['timeout']=time();} 
•  Security implementation against Cross-site Request forgery 
The function openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(16) and session time out were used to implement this 
security measure. 
 
• Security implementation against Exposed Access Credential 
A file type of .php was given to  the access credentials page labeled connect and this was executed 
but details of the credentials were not exposed. 
 
4.2 Security Test Results on WebPOS 
 
After the security implementations in section 3.2, the custom developed web application (WebPOS) 
was tested against the outlined vulnerabilities. This was done to determine if indeed the security 
measures were efficient and effective enough to shield the system against the vulnerabilities.  
 
Figure 4: Chart of Frameworks, Vul. Level 
 
 
Figure 5: Chart of Mean of vul. score 
 
 
All the tests for the outlined vulnerabilities were done in line with their respective methods defined 
under subsection 3.1 and the results recorded in Table 3.  For instance, for security test of XSS on 
WebPOS, a script was injected in a product description field but the output of the test resulted in a 
disruption of the script as it was encoded as shown under “Product Description:” in figure 6.  
 
From Figure 4, WebPOS registered the highest number of low vulnerability score of 1 followed by 
Joomla! and Moodle. From the chart of mean, Microsoft .Net framework had the highest mean score 
while WebPOS had the lowest as shown in Figure 5. In the usability study, the SUS test of the average 
of the ten users, the overall value representing the SU was 72.5 +/-22.1. 
5 Discussion 
The main objective of this research was to ascertain if some vulnerabilities exist in WAFs which 
could be driving the lead in web-based systems attack. The intention was to provide the vulnerabilities 
level in WAFs to users to serve as a guide in their choice of usage. The approach was guided by OWASP 
and other standards.  The purpose of the security implementation framework in the WebPOS was to 
demonstrate how the vulnerabilities could be shielded in implemented systems. The WebPOS also served 
as an attack tool for testing the vulnerabilities in the WAFs. From the summary of the statistical results 
in Table 3, all the WAFs had some vulnerabilities at varying level of protection. Security implementation 
against the various vulnerabilities were implemented and a test result on the implemented system 
(WebPOS) resulted in the lowest vulnerability score. The implemented system also passed an SUS test 
with a score of 72.5 +/-22.1.  
Among the four WAFs (.Net, Moodle, Joomla and Wordpress) studied, C# MVC .Net Framework 
(.Net) had the highest cumulative vulnerability score count of 17. The .Net framework did not obtain a 
lower score of 1 for any of the vulnerabilities tested. This implies that there was no complete protection 
against any of the vulnerabilities tested. Aside brute force attack, reverse shell attack and session 
hijacking vulnerabilities, the C# MVC .Net framework had a midway (level 2) security protection against 
EAC, SQLi, CSRF and XSS vulnerabilities as shown in Table 3. The high vulnerability score of the .Net 
framwork was registered due to the verboseness of the error messages in the implementation of the 
security measures which could turn to be educative to the attacker[4, 16]. For instance, with reference to 
the Table 3, all the frameworks studied had complete protection for EAC but the .Net framework had 
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incomplete protection due to the educative error messages which could aid secondary attack[4, 16].  
OWASP has noted that, hackers are most interested in  error messages since they might learn from some 
information leaked through error messages that could lead to further attacks[48]. Acunetix also disclosed 
that, error messages can  contain sensitive information such as the location of the file that produced the 
unhandled exception[49]. Furthermore, an attacker can use the information returned by error messages 
to deduce the technologies used in Web applications, determine if an attempted attack was successful 
and to gather hints to explore for future attacks [50]. In this regard, sensitive information ranging from 
web application version to physical file locations were disclosed in the error messages which lead to each 
of those vulnerabilities scoring vulnerability levels of 2. So, the .Net framework results was the lest 
secure framework largely because of its unhealthy error messages. 
Conversely, Moodle had the lowest cumulative vulnerability score count of 10 among the four WAFs 
studied as indicated in Table 3 and Figure 4. The test result have complete protection for EAC, RSA, 
SHJ,SQLi and XSS. For instance, in a file upload attack or RSA, an incorrect file type was uploaded 
onto Moodle site, but the file was not accepted to be uploaded and an error message “Filetype cannot be 
accepted”, was returned to the attacker. In this case, by reading the error message, the attacker would 
have no clue of resource location, version of application or any information that could enhance the attack. 
This led to a low vulnerability score of 1 as shown in Table 3.   
EAC and SQLi vulnerabilities had security measures implemented against them in all the 
frameworks. EAC is a serious vulnerability since access to the credential can enable hackers to take total 
control of the entire system. Potential problems arise when this file is somewhere within document 
root[39]. Usually, web servers render the content of a file in plain text if they are unable to work out the 
file type or the extension[39]. Such files containing user access credentials are displayed in plain text and 
this exposes the user credentials. The serious nature of issues of EAC could have been the reason why 
all the frameworks hd a security protection mechanism in their default settings against the EAC 
vulnerability.  
SQLi  is one of the OWASP top ten application vulnerabilities[51]. The high threat of this 
vulnerability is the reason why all the frameworks had protection mechanisms implemented in their 
default settings against SQLi. SQLi attack is done by injecting malicious codes onto user input space or 
appending it onto the url of the resource[2, 50, 52]. These malicious codes take advantage of 
vulnerabilities in SQL code structure. SQL injection of these codes have the potential of causing harm 
such as data deletion, updating, inserting, unauthorized access and many more[2, 50, 52]. SQL case 
insensitivity has become a dream for hackers since it offers flexibility to craft codes for attacks[2, 50, 
52] but a nightmare for security defenses as it is challenging to implement blacklisting defense. 
Precedence of evaluation of logical operators is another possible point of attack through SQL injection[4, 
16].   In an operation containing NOT, AND, OR, the NOT operator is evaluated first followed by AND 
operator and the OR operator. In the logical operation, the OR operator is always evaluated last and so 
the attacker creates a malicious code on existing dynamic SQL code to retrieve data from the system. A 
code of OR 1=1 injected onto the login screen could have bypassed the login credentials and compel the 
query to respond positively since 1=1 is always True[4, 16, 47]. 
In the WebPOS, the product page which had most of the security implementations basically enables 
a user to enter product type, product name, product classification or category and other related attributes. 
The product is then submitted to the database and can be accessed for sale if required through the sale 
screen. One of the reasons for using PHP in the WebPOS implementation, was because the majority of 
the WAFs tested were developed with PHP so the framework could be representative enough. With 
regards to the defensive programming, prepared statement is known to be used for shielding against 
injection attacks[26, 47]. In prepared statements, SQL statements are predefined, so the user input is 
independent on the SQL statement parsing [4, 16, 26, 47]. Therefore, the user data is treated as data alone 
and does not affect the SQL statement (SQLi) or code structure. As a result, the SQL injections, are not 
processed by the database in a malicious manner [4, 16, 26, 47]. Additionally, quote escape functions  
were used to prevent SQLi[26]. Such functions which are already in built into systems such as 
real_escape_string in PHP for MySql, were used for mitigation. Developers can create their own quote 
escaping functions to protect in systems such as MicroSoftSQL Server and Oracle[26] systems which  
do not have such inbuilt functions.  
 
 
Figure 6: XSS test Result on WebPOSS 
 
 
Figure 7 Test for CSRF in Joomla! 
 
IP binding and session timeout methods were used to secure the code against session high jacking. 
At login and during session creation, the remote IP address of the client and time logged-in were stored 
in respective sessions[42]. On accessing the page frmAddproducts.php, the stored IP address was 
compared with the current client’s IP accessing the page. If the ip differs, that client was logged out[42, 
53]. Also, if there is an inactivity for more than 30 minutes, in attempt to access the secured page, the 
session would expire and the user would be logged out[42, 53]. CSRF was protected by using generated 
session token[33]. On the user input form a random token was being generated into a token session by 
using the function openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(16)[54]. During processing, the token submitted by 
POST method was compared with the token stored in the session. If there was any variance, an alert 
message was generated and an alert of Invalid AntiCSRF displayed as shown in Figure 3. 
 
In protecting against EAC, a file type of  .php was used to store the system access credentials. Once 
a file type was provided at run time, the system does not display the access credentials in plain text[50]. 
Basic file type and size restriction were used to protect against RSA[37]. Usually,  the major aim of RSA 
is to upload some scripts or codes to the system and also finding a way to get the code executed[37]. If a 
shell script is uploaded, the attacker can navigate through the url and browse the server[37]. The result 
of file upload attack include complete system takeover, defacement, overloaded file system or database 
and forwarding attacks to back-end systems[37]. File size and type restriction method prevents upload 
of scripts and large file size or type that could have advert effect on the system [37].  
The WebPOS was also evaluated for the vulnerabilities using the same vulnerability test method as 
outlined in Table 2. This provided a common denominator for comparison of the security test results 
since a common method was used to test both the WAFs and the WebPOS. The results indicated that the 
WebPOS had the lowest vulnerability score for all the vulnerabilities tested and this resulted in a 
cumulative vulnerability score of 7. For instance, in testing for CSRF, Joomla! Web page was able to be 
loaded onto the iframe and also displayed the message “website is vulnerable to clickjacking” as shown 
in Figure 7. This attracted a vulnerability score of 3 since the test indicated no protection for the CSRF 
vulnerability. However, the webPOS page detected the malice and displayed the message “Invalid 
antiCSRF” as shown in figure 3. This attracted a vulnerability score of 1. 
 
 
Furthermore, the SUS result,  was 72.5 +/-22.1 meaning that the, custom-built WebPOS, was at least 
usable at SU of 50.3 up to 94.6. Generally, custom built systems are considered less usable in comparison 
with WAFs. For instance, a study of The Wayne State University (WSU) College of Engineering (COE) 
Content Management System was deemed to be unusable in comparison with Joomla WAF used to 
design other similar systems. A change was proposed to use Joomla! instead of the custom-build. 
Because Joomla offered better usability and maintain ease of administration. Joomla also consists of an 
array of templates in an organized fashion that facilitates easy navigation, an extension system to offer 
new features. It also consists of a user management system to administer user privileges and other several 
usability features [55]. It was noted that WAFs bring in open templates and plugins  enabling the look 
and feel of the site and features to be altered, added, or removed easily. A lot of issues were associated 
with the custom-built CMS. Scalability, unavailability of programmers, insufficient documentation of 
custom-built systems, inconsistent navigations, hardcoded database leading to difficulties in testing for 
new features are some of the issues which were associated with the custom-built system[55]. Conversely, 
open-source CMS provided complete documentation of the source code and allowed multiple developers 
to make improvements and bug fixes. In open source, the WAF’S original source code was available to 
view, download, compile, and change as the user wants for free. An open-source CMS uses a plugin 
architecture which allows additional features to be created as and when they are needed[55]. An ideal 
WAF is powerful enough to handle hundreds of users with thousands of webpages while being easy 
enough for users to navigate, edit, and administer. WAFs also employs Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) for authentication of servers[55]. User access control are included and able to restrict 
access to specific pages[55]. This suggests that there are more benefits in terms of usability in open 
source CMS but not in terms of security as shown in this study. 
The time spent in downloading and installing a WAF was about just an hour. Basically, MySQL 
database was downloaded and installed followed by WAFs. However, the development of WebPOS as 
at the stage it had reached (from login to adding product in the system) took about four weeks consisting 
of 20 working days. 8 hours were spent on each of these days leading to 160 hours. This implies that in 
comparison between configuration of a WAF verses developing a custom application costs an extra 159 
hours. Therefore, there is a huge cost savings in developing application using WAF as compared to 
custom built system development from scratch. 
What is also quite essential in this study is the adoption of a simple but effective web vulnerability 
scoring scheme (SS). SS classifies or rates web vulnerabilities based on the depth of penetration of an 
attack or malicious injects. A complete penetration of an attack in this study had a score value of 3, 
incomplete attracted a score of 2 and none- penetration or complete resistance to the attack led to a score 
value of 1. Some vulnerability scoring systems which are commonly used include Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) [30], Vulnerability Rating and Scoring System (VRSS)[31] and Microsoft 
security update severity rating [32] but their target users are  security experts and highly skillful IT 
personnel [3][4]. They include vendors who might be bias in their scoring and IT security experts may 
be expensive for hiring affordability of SMEs. These commonly used vulnerability scoring systems target 
user groups are Software Application Vendors, Vulnerability Scanning and Management, Security (Risk) 
Management. The user groups excludes SMEs you are not security experts[3][4]. In view of this, a 
simpler but effective tool (SS) was developed for scoring the vulnerabilities in this study. This would 
afford low skilled IT security practitioners, who may be associated with SMEs, to be able to use the SS 
for vulnerability related analysis. 
The study was tested on default settings of the WAFs since novice might lack the technical capabilities 
to configure the security settings on them prior to their usage. So even if there was a security provision 
for any of the vulnerabilities which was not implemented in the default settings, the security test would 
miss it. Further, an SUS study of WAFs would have given an absolute comparison and evaluation in 
terms of usability. In fact, the methodology of the analysis of usability of WebPOS representing custom-
built system differs from that of the WAFs. In the WebPOS, the qualitative data of the user perception 
of the system was quantified by using the SUS method which represented a single measure. But the 
qualitative data of the user experience studied in the WAFs [55] was not quantified. Despites this, the 
comparison still holds because certain shortfalls of the custom-built systems are unarguable. For instance, 
in a custom-designed system (WebPOS), if the programmer was not available and documentation of the 
application was not sufficient, it implies that scalability and maintainability of the code would become a 
challenge. Whereas in the case of WAFs, multiple developers and documentation exist, leading to 
efficient scalability and maintainability.  WAFs are used by numerous of users and so, the feedback of 
the users were used to improve upon the systems which resulted in high usability[6]. 
Conclusion 
Due to the high rate of usage of web application frameworks and the high rate of increased in data 
breaches through attacks on web applications, it becomes necessary to investigate into the most 
commonly used WAFs for the presence of the most common web vulnerabilities. The broad objective 
was to determine if web vulnerabilities were present in the default WAFs which were driving the lead in 
frequency of attack. WordPress, Moodle, Joomla and MVC C# .Net Framework, were investigated. The 
vulnerabilities which were studied are SQLi, XSS, File upload, Cross-site Request Forgery CSRF and 
Brute Force Attack. In the result, Moodle showed less vulnerabilities and proved to be more secure 
among the four WAFs studied aside other factors. Essentially, there were some vulnerabilities associated 
with the web templates studied. These vulnerabilities had the potentials to be used to gain ingress into 
systems. A Point of Sales system (WebPOS)  was then developed and used for implementing a security 
framework against the tested vulnerabilities. With these findings, SMEs and other users would know the 
vulnerabilities associated with the various templates. The vulnerability levels which were discovered in 
the WAFs would provide knowleged for users in their choice of WAFs.  The implementation framework 
for mitigation would also guide users to implement the appropriate sanitization for related vulnerabilities 
if they desire to use a WAFs which has these vulnerabilities. Such related research results would reduce 
the numerous vulnerabilities and attacks of systems through web applications.  
Finally, it would be a great addition to the body of knowledge and an interesting piece to expand the 
study to determine the cost benefit analysis of  installing and securing a WAF verses building and 
securing custom-built system. Evaluation in terms of performance between custom built systems and 
WAF could also be conducted in the future since the scope of this project did not cover that. Further to 
this, there still exists other commonly used web application systems such as Drupal and more recent 
vulnerabilities such as Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). These common frameworks and recent 
vulnerabilities would be highly considered in further works.  
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